

M-1719

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2 October 1952

ATTN : Chief, EE Division
FI/G
Assistant Director for Communications

Indigenous Stay-behind Personnel

REFERENCE: Your memorandum, subject as above, dated 8 September 1952

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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1. A basic policy, as such, has not been formulated on an "across the board" basis concerning evacuation and use of indigenous personnel who have been active in the communications elements of stay-behind developments.

2. In view of the multitudinous conditions and varying degrees of knowledge and/or mission of indigenous organizers and developers in the stay-behind field, we have considered each operation, project and program on an individual basis in the matter of evacuation and utilization. In the majority of cases involving indigenous personnel used to recruit, train and develop stay-behind WT circuits, we should either provide for evacuation or otherwise neutralize the indigenous person or persons possessing sufficient knowledge to endanger a given stay-behind program.

3. For planning purposes, a precedent has been set in the WE area where key or principal indigenous organizers and communications trainers will generally be evacuated under the auspices of this organization. The necessity for providing evacuation rests in the operationally dangerous knowledge held by the individual or individuals concerned. In the case of WE, the indigenous persons affected have as complete a knowledge of the stay-behind agents and organization as ourselves.

4. In the case of CAGLIO-2 and other indigenous communications training agents in Germany, you are in a better position to judge the extent of knowledge of stay-behind personnel and organization than we of Communications. If effective and continuing security safe guards have been employed in utilizing an indigenous agent to train a limited number of stay-behind communications agents, it may not be necessary to evacuate the indigenous PASTIME instructors and principal or organizer agents should be evacuated when possible.

5. If evacuated to a CIA controlled area, the problem of utilization of such personnel is raised. As a basic Communications security policy we cannot permit the integration of indigenous personnel into a CIA base radio station since any such base is the focal point of extensive CIA operations. Any operator serving in such a base is, therefore, exposed to the key to a complex of CIA operations rather than the one project already known to the indigenous.

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6. The abilities of evacuated indigenous communications personnel can and should be used for training purposes at a CIA controlled safe area. The undersigned would be most happy to discuss such application at your convenience.

FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR COMMUNICATIONS:

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Acting Chief,
Plans and Policy Staff